Machiavellian Intelligence and Socio-Economic Status as Predictors of Political Preference

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Abstract

Political preference is understood to be shaped by dispositional as well as situational factors. In this study, we show that Machiavellian intelligence and socio-economic status do not predict political preference in a Dutch student population. We investigated whether behavioural measures of Machiavellian intelligence are linked to political preferences on an economic or social scale. Machiavellian intelligence was measured using the difference in contributions in the common dictator and ultimatum games. However, no significant relationship between Machiavellian intelligence, socio-economic status, and political preference is found. We further show that a high level of contributions in the dictator game is associated with left-leaning economic preferences. Our findings support recent research that dictator game performance is a measure of altruism, a personality trait which has been found to be correlated with leftist political preferences.

Keywords: Machiavellian intelligence, political preference, socio-economic status, altruism, dictator game.

I. Introduction

Political preferences shape voting behaviour, involvement in activism and support for contentious issues. As the Frankfurt School critical theorists around Adorno (Adorno et al., 1950) wrote, "ideologies have for different individuals, different degrees of appeal, a matter
that depends upon the individual's needs and the degree to which these needs are being satisfied or frustrated." In other words, a complex network of interrelated dispositional and situational variables determines political preferences. The core of the economic dimension of political preferences are attitudes towards equality, or individuals' self-interest and fairness. These values are closely linked to the concept of an evolved "Machiavellian" or social intelligence. In this study, we therefore investigate whether an individual's degree of Machiavellian intelligence, as well as their socio-economic status, can predict political preferences.

II. Theory

Political Preference (DV)

Political preference is best understood as the set of attitudes that finds its expression in voting behaviour, political activism and support for contentious issues. Historically, and still today in the popular press, the political spectrum has been understood as a left-right continuum, or a progressive-conservative dichotomy in the United States. More recently, two- or multi-axis models have been proposed to accommodate the variety among political parties particularly in Western Europe.

Jost et al. (2003a, 2003b), in their study of the cognitive underpinnings of political ideologies, identify two core dimensions on which a liberal/conservative dichotomy is based, namely attitudes towards inequality, and attitudes towards social change; here, a negative attitude towards inequality and a positive attitude towards social change makes up the core of a liberal ideology or political preference.

A multi-axis model is adopted by Raaijmakers et al. (1998), who use two dimensions to distinguish between economic and cultural attitudes. The economic dimension comprises attitudes towards "equality of income and property" as well as "socio-economic radicalism", whereas the cultural dimension includes attitudes towards tolerance of alternative lifestyles, freedom of expression, contentious issues such as abortion and euthanasia, authoritarianism, and ethnocentrism. Their study also provides some evidence that the impacts that shape economic and cultural attitudes differ. In this study we thus adopt a two-axis model of political preferences along a social liberal/conservative and an economic left/right continuum.
Literature review

Political preference is likely not determined by any singly factor, but by a complex set of interrelated factors. Two broad explanatory approaches in the existing literature can be distinguished, which are also linked to general trends in the behavioural sciences. On the one hand, dispositional variables have been considered, based on the assumption that political attitudes are rooted in deeper psychological needs or personality traits. On the other hand, situational (environmental) variables are implicated in individuals' formation of political preferences (Jost, 2006).

The study of personality traits as a root for political preferences reaches back to Adorno et al.'s (1950) concept of the "authoritarian personality", but has experienced a resurgence of interest in recent years (Jost, 2006). Many studies refer to the "big five" personality traits, openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Political conservatism has been associated positively with conscientiousness and politeness (an aspect of agreeableness) and negatively with openness, whereas liberalism has been associated positively with openness and a second aspect of agreeableness, compassion (Hirsh et al., 2010). Evidence for the heritability of conservatism supports this grounding of political attitudes in underlying psychological traits (Bouchard et al., 2003). However, Thorisdottir et al. (2007) have also shown (regional) context-specific effects of personality traits such as openness with regard to political preference on a left-right continuum.

A variety of situational factors have been implicated in the formation of political attitudes. Historically, religion and social class have been dominant political divisions in Western Europe; however, the influence of religion and social class has significantly declined in the Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2001). Nevertheless, there is still a strong association between working class and economic progressivism (De Weerdt & De Witte, 2001). Higher education has frequently been found to be associated with socially liberal attitudes (Phelan et al., 1995). Studies of intergenerational party preference transmission have frequently shown high similarity between parents' and children's party preferences (Nieuwbeerta & Wittebrood, 1995). Religion, education, and social status of members of individuals' social networks also impact voting behaviour, in particular through strong ties (Nieuwbeerta & Flap, 2000).
Machiavellian Intelligence (IV)

In this study, we are testing two explanatory variables for political preference on an economic and social dimension. Firstly, we are proposing that Machiavellian intelligence is positively associated with social conservatism and right-wing economic attitudes. Studying the link between Machiavellian intelligence and political preference is particularly interesting as it implies a biological basis of attitudes. While the impact of dispositional as well as situational factors on political preference has been acknowledged (Adorno et al., 1950; Jost, 2006), the former have received far less attention in the literature, and biological differences remain neglected by much of the social sciences. Secondly, based on the large body of research on the role of situational variables in the formation of political preference we are proposing that high socio-economic status is linked to social liberalism and right-wing economic policies.

Machiavellian intelligence, also known as political intelligence or social intelligence, refers to an individual’s characteristic to act out of self-interest as much as possible without violating social norms and rules (Spitzer et al., 2007). According to the “Social Brain Hypothesis” (Dunbar, 2003), social or Machiavellian intelligence is positively correlated with the ability to comply with social norms when punishment will follow from non-compliance, and to violate social norms or rules when no punishment will follow or punishment can be avoided (e.g. by cheating). In the same line of reasoning, altruistic behaviour, i.e. behaviour that does not benefit the altruistic individual in any way, should be negatively correlated with Machiavellian intelligence since this behaviour is not driven by self-interested (assuming non-punishment in case of non-altruistic behaviour). Indeed, as Spitzer et al. (2007) have demonstrated, a high measure of Machiavellian intelligence is associated with less altruistic behaviour. In terms of “true” (i.e. reciprocal) altruism, a person with a high degree of Machiavellian intelligence acts more self-interested and less “fair”.

In the past, studies on self-interest and fairness have demonstrated that these factors influence political preference (Sears & Funk, 1991; Esarey, Salmon, and Barrilleux, 2011). These studies indicated that the level of self-interest is positively correlated with political conservatism, while fairness is positively correlated with political liberalism (Esarey et al., 2011, p. 19). Also, with regard to the economic values on the political spectrum, traits such as self-interest indicate right-wing political
preference, while fairness (or benevolence) indicates left-wing political preference (Caprara et al., 2006). This study thus hypothesizes that Machiavellian intelligence in positively correlated with social conservatism and right-wing economic values (such as economic freedom) and negatively correlated with social liberalism and left-wing economic values (such as economic equality).

**Socio-Economic Status (IV)**

Socio-economic status is a compound measure of an individual's social and economic status based on a measure of income, education, and occupation, and in some cases class. Socio-economic status has frequently been implicated in the formation of political preferences. In particular, high education has been linked to socially liberal attitudes. Phelan et al. (1995) compare three explanatory models for this association: cognitive and personality development, direct socialization, and "ideological refinement". They conclude that higher education socializes students to "official culture", i.e. that education has no inherently liberalizing quality. With respect to the Netherlands, given the country's liberal mainstream culture, a liberal socialization through higher education would have to be expected. With regard to the economic dimension of political preference, the working class has historically held leftist attitudes, and in the Netherlands working class occupation is still strongly associated with economic progressivism (De Weerdt & De Witte, 2001).

The role of social class in the formation of political preferences has been declining in the Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2001). Güveli et al. (2007) therefore adopt theories about a new, post-industrial class structure with a division between managers, business owners and industrial as the old and a new class of knowledge workers or "social and cultural specialists". They find that independently of education and income, the social and cultural specialists vote more left-wing and hold more socially liberal attitudes. Based on this development, we hypothesize that higher socio-economic status is positively associated with social liberalism and right-wing economic policies, but will exhibit significant within-group variance caused by the erosion of historical class divisions.
III. Methodology

The research design consists of three distinct parts. An experimental design using ultimatum and dictator games will be used to determine the Machiavellian intelligence score of the subjects (first independent variable). A survey will be used to measure the socio-economic status of the subjects (second independent variable). Another survey will be used to measure political attitudes of the subjects (dependent variable).
Dictator & Ultimatum Games

The behavioural measure for Machiavellian intelligence consists of two games, an ultimatum game and a dictator game. In the dictator game, player A receives some among of monetary units in the form of tokens, which he can freely share with Player B. In this one-shot game, there is no reason for a self-interested player A to give any amount of money to Player B, yet many studies have indicated that such “altruistic” behaviour regularly occurs (Forsythe et al., 1994). An ultimatum game resembles a dictator game with one crucial difference: Player B has the option to either accept the given amount of monetary units or to reject it, in which case neither player A nor player B receives any pay-off. The ultimatum game, then, differs from the dictator game because of the presence of a possible punishment, which would motivate player A to act “altruistically”. However, as van Dijk et al. argued (2004), the altruistic behaviour in the ultimatum game might just be a strategic use of fairness to maximize self-interest because of the threat of punishment. Therefore, altruistic behaviour in the dictator game could be coined “true altruism”, as opposed to the altruism driven by self-interest in the ultimatum game, because of the absence of a means of punishment for player B.

By comparing the scores between the ultimatum game and the dictator game, the degree of Machiavellian intelligence can be measured (Spitzer et al., 2007). An individual who keeps all the money in the dictator game (displaying no “true” altruism) and splits the money 50/50 in the ultimatum game (to avoid punishment by rejection) can be said to have a high degree of Machiavellian intelligence, because of the primary drive for self-interest and the understanding of social norms and rules. On the other end of the spectrum, an individual who splits the money similarly in the dictator game as in the ultimatum game can be said to have a low degree of Machiavellian intelligence (because of the “true” altruism in the dictator game).

In the experiment, Players B in the two games were played by two confederates, as their reaction is not relevant to the measure, while the pure existence and presence of a Player B increases mundane realism and thus external validity. Study participants took the role of Player A. In the ultimatum game, the confederate was instructed to accept offers of 40% or more of Player A’s endowment, and to reject all lower offers. We made sure that the subjects and the confederates were not familiar with each other, thus
decreasing a possible bias in the dictator game caused by the expectancy of social punishment outside of the experimental setting. In order to eliminate the influence of punishment in the ultimatum game on Player A’s decision in the dictator game, there were two different confederates - one for each game. In order to eliminate a possible order effect, the order of dictator and ultimatum game was assigned randomly for each subject.

Incentives relative to the participants’ gain in monetary units increase experimental realism (Croson, 2005, p.133). As the financial possibilities of the research are highly limited, cake was used because it is commonly valued and is until a certain amount non-satiable – individuals prefer to have more candy (ibid., p.134). Participants could choose from two kinds of cake in order to increase non-satiability.

**Surveys**

Both the information about socio-economic status and about political preferences of the subjects was collected using surveys. The first survey asked for factual information about the socio-economic background of participants, whereas the other survey asked about their political attitudes. In order to limit a possible impact of the surveys on our behavioural measure, participants were asked to fill out the surveys after the experimental games.

Socio-economic status was assessed by use of a survey which gathers information about the socio-economic background of participants, a method commonly used in several disciplines to obtain information about the standpoint of participants (Cirino et al., 2002, p.145). We used Barratt's Simplified Measure of Social Status (BSMSS, App. 1, Barratt, 2006), a simplified and updated measure based on the Hollingshead index (Hollingshead, 1975), to measure social status, which was used as a proxy for socio-economic status. Using social status as a proxy for socio-economic status was justified as we can assume high homogeneity in income for our student population sample. The BSMSS measures subjects' and their parents' educational attainment and professional prestige. We adjusted the BSMSS questionnaire such that the educational attainment scores were based on the Dutch education system. After completion we scored the BSMSS results according to the key developed by Barratt. This weights participants' scores 2:1 to parents' scores, and weights occupational prestige stronger than
educational attainment.

Political preference was measured using a set of seven scales (App. 2), each made up of several 5-point Likert items (“completely agree”, “agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree”, “completely disagree”). The survey was adapted from Raaijmakers et al.’s (1998) study on political attitudes among adolescents and young adults. The scales were sufficiently reliable, with a Cronbach’s alpha for all scales above .8 (above .71 for the social dimension and above .86 for the economic dimension).

On the economic dimension, attitudes were assessed using three scales:

- *Equality of income and property* (8 items)
- *Role of unions* (4 items)

On the social dimension, attitudes were assessed using five scales

- *Attitude towards social change* (4 items)
- *Gender equality* (4 items)
- *Tolerance of alternative lifestyles* (7 items)
- *Freedom to express one’s opinion* (6 items)
- *Acceptance of abortion and euthanasia* (2 items)

From the answers, we computed two variables; “economic preference” for the economic dimension, and “social preference” for the social dimension. These two data points can be understood as coordinates on a Nolan chart.

**Sampling**

The sample consisted of 28 undergraduate students from Amsterdam University College. Since the study is concerned with differences in behaviour on an individual level, the sample's lack of representativeness for a larger population can be neglected. Although we did not collect data on age or gender, we can assume an age range between 18 and 25 and an about-equal gender distribution.

IV. Results

The outcomes of our experiments conform with previous findings reported in the literature (e.g. Forsythe et al., 1994), although the number of players defaulting on the
The ultimatum game is comparably low. In the dictator game, equally many players contributed nothing (n=8) as contributed half of their endowment (n=8), with the rest of the players in between these values (n=12). In the ultimatum game, we observed the predicted shift towards an equal share, with more than two thirds of players contributing half of their endowment (n=19). Only three players contributed less than our set threshold of three money units, thus losing their endowment. Consequently, the distribution of Machiavelli scores is right-skewed. More than half of the subjects did not change their contribution from one game to the other (n=11), and only five subjects maximized their gains effectively, i.e. receiving a Machiavelli score of five. The average Machiavelli score was 1.9 (s=2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machiavelli Score</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Preference</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Preference</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic Status</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for Machiavelli score, economic preference, social preference, and socio-economic status.

The results from the survey on socio-economic status reveal a skew to the left with a very high mean of 51.7 (s=11.5), reflecting the high socio-economic status of the student body at Amsterdam University College. The survey on political preference revealed clearly different results for social and economic preferences. Economic preferences were normally distributed across nearly the whole range of the scale (between 1.55 and 3.91), and had a mean at 2.81 (s=.67). In contrast, social preferences focused on the liberal side of the scale, with a mean at 1.93 (s=.29). Indeed, the maximum was at 2.48, i.e. no subject scored even in the centre of the scale.

To analyse the data collected in our experiments and surveys, we ran two regressions with economic and social preference, respectively, as dependent variables.
and the combined Machiavelli score (ultimatum game contribution minus dictator game contribution) as well as the socio-economic status score from the BSMSS as independent variables. We examined our data for violations of the regression assumptions. However, we did not find any regression outliers (standardized residuals for both regressions < 2), did not observe a non-linear relationship between variables, did not observe a strong violation of normality in the distribution of errors, and did not observe homoskedasticity. Furthermore, we controlled for the order in the games were played, but did not find any significant influence of order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p MI</th>
<th>p SES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Preference</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>2.099</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Preference</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.969</td>
<td>.835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Regression results for IV’s Machiavellian intelligence, socio-economic status; DV’s economic preference, social preference (N=28). Model fit $R^2$, ANOVA F-Test, and p-values for bot IV’s (t-test).

**Hypotheses about economic preference**

We hypothesised that Machiavellian intelligence and socio-economic status both have a positive association with right-wing economic preferences. Indeed, a multiple regression analysis of Machiavellian intelligence and SES as predictors of economic preference (Table 2, App. 3) reveals that both independent variables correlate positively with right-wing economic preference. Machiavelli intelligence has a slope of .092 while SES has a slope of .014, which both prove to be insignificant (with respective $p = .161$ and $p = .195$). Also, since there is no interaction effect ($p(\text{interaction}) = .790$), we cannot conclude that either independent variable has a significant main effect on economic preference. Therefore we reject our initial hypotheses.

**Hypotheses about social preference**

We hypothesised that Machiavellian intelligence has a negative association with social liberalism, and that socio-economic status has a positive association with social liberalism. However, a multiple regression analysis of Machiavellian intelligence and SES as predictors of social preference (Table 2, App. 4) proves highly insignificant (with
respective $p = .969$ and $p = .835$). Hence we reject our initial hypotheses.

Further investigations
Furthermore, we correlated all variables with each other (SES, dictator game, ultimatum game, Machiavelli game, social preference, economic preference). This revealed a significant negative correlation between dictator game contribution and right-wing economic preference ($p = .037$). The correlation table did not reveal a significant correlation between social and economic preference ($p > .1$).

V. Discussion

Opposed to our hypotheses, Machiavellian intelligence and SES seem to be unsuitable to significantly predict political preference. Neither of the two dimensions, economic or cultural, correlate significantly with SES or the behaviour displayed in the economic games. Although the traits associated with Machiavellian intelligence have been demonstrated to relate to political attitudes and preference, this study has been unsuccessful in validating this relationship. Since previous research supports our hypothesized relation between Machiavellian intelligence, SES, and political preference (Spitzer et al., 2007; De Weert & De Witte, 2001), the potential causes for our insignificant findings are likely to be due to homogeneous results, small sample size, and excluded mediating variables.

First, the results in the subjects’ Machiavellian intelligence-score show very little variance. Apparently, AUC students tend to adhere to a very Machiavellian strategy when playing economic games as demonstrated by the fact that only three of the 28 subjects defaulted on the Ultimatum Game, which indicates a high degree of Machiavellian intelligence on average. The little variance on Machiavellian intelligence then results in an uneven distribution. A potential cause for this homogeneity might be that general intelligence is positively correlated with Machiavellian intelligence. Assuming this, the above average intelligence of AUC students (as measured in scholastic performance) might explain the disproportional scores on Machiavellian intelligence. Thus, for future research, a larger and more diverse sample might eradicate this disproportionality.
A second consequence of our small and non-random sample is the strong skew towards social liberalism on the cultural dimension. Phelan et al. (1995) already indicated that educational level and social liberalism are positively correlated, thus it is not unlikely to find this skew in a sample of 28 college undergraduates at a prestigious Dutch university. Moreover, the small variance in the cultural dimension and its skew towards social liberalism might explain why the two dimensions are, counter to previous research, unrelated to each other (i.e. do not correlate significantly).

Lastly, perhaps other factors might fully mediate our independent variables, meaning that factors which we did not include in our research might primarily cause the variance of our dependent variables. In retrospective, it is possible that, for instance, parent voting behaviour largely determines political preference, overriding our proposed independent variables of Machiavellian intelligence and social status (see Nieuwbeerta & Wittebrood, 1995).

Although not initially hypothesized, we found a correlation between the score on the Dictator game and the economic dimension, which supports existing evidence on the positive association between scores on the Dictator game and altruistic personality traits (Forsythe et al., 2004), as well as the positive association between altruistic traits and the relative direction to the left of the economic dimension (Caprara et al., 2006).

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VII. Appendix

App. 1:

See

http://wbarratt.indstate.edu/socialclass/Barratt_Simplified_Measure_of_Social_Status .pdf

App. 2: Questionnaire on political preference
Nu volgen enkele uitspraken over verschillen in inkomen en aanzien tussen de mensen, over de positieve van werknemers, en over de vakbonden. Kruis het hokje aan dat het best bij jouw mening past.

1. **Arbeiders moeten nog steeds strijden om een gelijkwaardige positie in de maatschappij te krijgen.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

2. **De verschillen in aanzien tussen rijke en arme mensen zouden kleiner moeten zijn dan nu.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

3. **Het is onrechtvaardig dat mensen met een hoog inkomen veel meer voorrechten hebben dan mensen met een laag inkomen.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

4. **De standsverschillen (verschillen in aanzien tussen de mensen) zouden kleiner moeten zijn dan nu.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

5. **De verschillen tussen hoge en lage inkomens zouden kleiner moeten zijn dan nu.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

6. **De verschillen in bezig tussen de mensen zouden kleiner moeten zijn dan nu.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

7. **De overheid moet ingrijpende maatregelen nemen om de verschillen tussen hoge en lage inkomens te verkleinen.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

8. **De vakbonden moeten een veel hardere politiek voeren willen zij de belangen van de werknemers werkelijk kunnen behartigen.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens

Op dit moment vind ik in het leven:

12. **Je inzetten voor een samenleving waarin iedereen kan meebeslissen...**
   0 Heel erg belangrijk
   0 Erg belangrijk
   0 Belangrijk
   0 Daar ben ik onzeker over/weet ik niet

13. **Grote gelijkheid in de maatschappij bevorderen**
   0 Heel erg belangrijk
   0 Erg belangrijk
   0 Belangrijk
   0 Daar ben ik onzeker over/weet ik niet

14. **Meewerken aan het verminderen van bestaande inkomensverschillen**
   0 Heel erg belangrijk
   0 Erg belangrijk
   0 Belangrijk
   0 Daar ben ik onzeker over/weet ik niet

15. **Het doorbreken van bestaande machtsverhoudingen**
   0 Heel erg belangrijk
   0 Erg belangrijk
   0 Belangrijk
   0 Daar ben ik onzeker over/weet ik niet

Hieronder vind je een aantal uitspraken over de taken van man en vrouw, over hun verhouding en over de opvoeding van jongens en meisjes. Wil je elke uitspraak lezen en weer aangeven in hoeverre je het er mee eens of oneens bent.

16. **Een vrouw is geschikter om kleine kinderen op te voeden dan een man.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
0 Mee eens
0 Niet eens/niet oneens
0 Niet mee eens
0 Helemaal niet mee eens

17. **Man en vrouw moeten het huishoudelijk werk gelijkelijk onder elkaar verdelen.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

18. **Het huishouden is evengoed de verantwoordelijkheid van de man als van de vrouw.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

19. **Kinderverzorging is evengoed de verantwoordelijkheid van de man als van de vrouw.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens


20. **Ongehuwd samenwonen, zonder kinderen, vind ik…**
   0 Zeer aanvaardbaar
   0 Aanvaardbaar
   0 Maakt mij niets uit
   0 Oanaarbaar
   0 Zeer onaarbaar

21. **Bewust ongehuwd moeder zijn, vind ik…**
   0 Zeer aanvaardbaar
   0 Aanvaardbaar
   0 Maakt mij niets uit
   0 Oanaarbaar
   0 Zeer onaarbaar

22. **Als homoseksueel of lesbische samenwonen met een vaste partner, vind ik…**
   0 Zeer aanvaardbaar
   0 Aanvaardbaar
   0 Maakt mij niets uit
   0 Oanaarbaar
   0 Zeer onaarbaar

23. **Zonder partner leven, vind ik…**
   0 Zeer aanvaardbaar
   0 Aanvaardbaar
   0 Maakt mij niets uit
   0 Oanaarbaar
   0 Zeer onaarbaar
24. Ongehuwd samenwonen, met eigen kinderen, vind ik…
0 Zeer aanvaardbaar
0 Aanvaardbaar
0 Maakt mij niets uit
0 Onaanvaardbaar
0 Zeer onaanvaardbaar

25. Een langeafstandsrelatie vind ik…
0 Zeer aanvaardbaar
0 Aanvaardbaar
0 Maakt mij niets uit
0 Onaanvaardbaar
0 Zeer onaanvaardbaar

26. Samenwonen als voorbereiding op het huwelijk vind ik…
0 Zeer aanvaardbaar
0 Aanvaardbaar
0 Maakt mij niets uit
0 Onaanvaardbaar
0 Zeer onaanvaardbaar


27. In ons land moet iedereen vrij zijn om te zeggen wat hij of zij wil.
0 Helemaal mee eens
0 Mee eens
0 Niet eens/niet oneens
0 Niet mee eens
0 Helemaal niet mee eens

28. In ons land moet iedereen vrij zijn om in het openbaar te schrijven wat hij of zij wil.
0 Helemaal mee eens
0 Mee eens
0 Niet eens/niet oneens
0 Niet mee eens
0 Helemaal niet mee eens

29. In ons land moet iedereen vrij zijn om voor of tegen iets te demonstreren.
0 Helemaal mee eens
0 Mee eens
0 Niet eens/niet oneens
0 Niet mee eens
0 Helemaal niet mee eens

30. In ons land moet iedereen vrij zijn om openlijke kritiek te leveren op het koningshuis.
0 Helemaal mee eens
0 Mee eens
0 Niet eens/niet oneens
0 Niet mee eens
0 Helemaal niet mee eens

31. In ons land moet iedereen vrij zijn om militaire dienst te weigeren.
0 Helemaal mee eens
0 Mee eens
0 Niet eens/niet oneens
0 Niet mee eens
32. **In ons land moet iedereen vrij zijn om gebouwen te bezetten (bijv. scholen, bedrijven, of universiteiten) als dit helpt om gerechtvaardigde eisen kracht bij te zetten.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

Hieronder volgen enkele uitspraken over kwesties van leven en dood. Kruis het hokje aan dat het beste bij jouw mening past.

33. **Een vrouw moet abortus uit kunnen laten voeren als zij dit wenst.**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

34. **Mensen moeten het recht hebben door een arts een einde te laten maken aan hun leven als zij dat willen (euthanasie).**
   0 Helemaal mee eens
   0 Mee eens
   0 Niet eens/niet oneens
   0 Niet mee eens
   0 Helemaal niet mee eens

App. 3: Regression output for DV economic preference
### Variables Entered/Removed\(^b\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Variables Entered</th>
<th>Variables Removed</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SocStat, MachiavellScore</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>Enter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) All requested variables entered; \n\(^b\) Dependent Variable: EconomicPref

### Model Summary\(^b\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.379(^a)</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.64745</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Predictors: (Constant), SocStat, MachiavellScore \n\(^b\) Dependent Variable: EconomicPref

### ANOVA\(^b\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Regression</td>
<td>1.760</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.880</td>
<td>2.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>10.480</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>419</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.239</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Predictors: (Constant), SocStat, MachiavellScore \n\(^b\) Dependent Variable: EconomicPref

### Coefficients\(^*\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>95.0% Confidence Interval for B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>1.885</td>
<td>.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MachiavellScore</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SocStat</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\) Dependent Variable: EconomicPref
App. 4: Regression output for DV social preference

### Variables Entered/Removed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Variables Entered</th>
<th>Variables Removed</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SocStat, Machiavelli Score</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>Enter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. All requested variables entered  
b. Dependent Variable: SocialPref

### Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.042*</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>.30176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), SocStat, MachiavelliScore  
b. Dependent Variable: SocialPref

### ANOVA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Regression</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>022</td>
<td>.978*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>022</td>
<td>.978*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.276</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), SocStat, MachiavelliScore  
b. Dependent Variable: SocialPref

### Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>95.0% Confidence Interval for B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>1.875</td>
<td>.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MachiavelliScore</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SocStat</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Dependent Variable: SocialPref